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Abstract 
 
Knowledge is the most important asset that a 
company can have. Thus, it is imperative that this 
asset is safeguarded just like generic information 
assets. However, knowledge management (KM) and 
knowledge systems are different than traditional 
information systems with different threats and 
different operational requirements. Information 
Security professionals recognize that risk assessment 
is the cornerstone to information security. We build 
on this perspective and propose that risk assessment 
techniques need to be applied to KM too to properly 
safeguard this asset. We discuss risk assessment 
frameworks and build on a KM/knowledge system 
specific risk assessment framework with a step-by-
step guideline for KM/knowledge system specific 
threat assessment.   
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Whitman and Mattord [33] quote Sun Tzu Wu on 
the importance of knowing yourself and knowing 
your enemy as a key to success in battle, or in 
designing and implementing information systems 
security.  To accomplish the knowing of yourself and 
your enemy the corner stone of information 
systems/cyber security is the process of risk 
assessment.  Risk assessment is used to know 
yourself by identifying data/information/ 
knowledge/technology assets (henceforth simplified 
to knowledge assets) and assigning.  Risk assessment 
helps organizations know the enemy by determining 
the threats that could attack the organization’s 
knowledge assets.  Risk management then uses these 
inputs to analyze the overall risk to the knowledge 
asset and determine the controls to be used to 
mitigate or remove the risk.  All major security 
frameworks include a risk assessment and 
management process.  For the United States the 
Nationals Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) provides the risk management framework 
(RMF) as described in special publication, SP 800-12 
rev 1, An Introduction to Information Security [21], 
SP 800-37 rev 2, Risk Management Framework for 
Information Systems and Organizations: A System 
Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy [23], 
and SP 800-53 rev 5 (draft), Security and Privacy 
Controls for Information Systems and Organizations 
[24].  A similar process is outlined by the 
International Standards Organization (ISO).  
ISO 27001:2013 Information technology -- Security 
techniques -- Information security management 
systems – Requirements [7] and ISO  7005:2018, 
Information technology -- Security techniques -- 
Information security risk management [8]. 
While these are fine risk frameworks, they are 
generic in nature and are not tailored specifically to 
knowledge management, KM, or knowledge systems.  
We do not claim that KM/knowledge systems are so 
unique as to require their own risk frameworks or that 
the above-mentioned risk frameworks are not useful.  
We are stating that KM/knowledge system managers 
will do a better job of risk assessment/ management 
of KM/knowledge systems if they have tailored 
guidance, specifically in two areas: threat assessment 
and risk analysis.  Why do we think KM/knowledge 
systems need special guidance?  We argue that the 
purpose of KM and knowledge systems are to 
support the sharing and application of knowledge by 
supporting decision making, throughout the 
organization to achieve organizational goals.  Since 
the purpose is to share knowledge the tenets of 
information security are inherently at odds with 
KM/knowledge systems.  It is our opinion that 
information security is still needed but should be 
applied in ways that recognize the uniqueness of 
knowledge sharing and decision processes. Jennex 
and Durcikova [18] examined the integration of KM 
and security and found that security was not 
integrated into the KM job functions. Thus, the 
purpose of this paper is to provide specific guidance 
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and requirements for KM/knowledge systems threat 
assessments and risk analysis.  In addition, this paper 
is focusing on the risk of knowledge loss from a 
human source (we will only focus on this asset). 
Knowledge loss risk is defined as the expected 
impact to the organization resulting from the loss of a 
particular expert or knowledge worker. This is 
consistent with the NIST [23] risk definition so the 
NIST risk algorithm will be used as the basis for 
determining knowledge loss risk. 
This paper first starts with an overview of risk 
and risk management, threats and threat assessment, 
risk frameworks, and knowledge management 
(KM)/knowledge systems risk frameworks.  This is 
followed by a KM/knowledge systems specific threat 
assessment that is based on literature review followed 
by a KM/knowledge systems risk framework 
proposal also based on literature review that 
incorporates the KM/knowledge systems specific 
risks.  The literature review includes analysis of 
previous case studies and other research.  
 
2. Background: Risk and Risk 
Assessment  
 
The NIST SP 800-37r2 [23] describes risk as the 
net negative impact of the exercise of a vulnerability; 
considering both the probability and the impact of 
occurrence. Risk is traditionally represented by the 
following formula: 
 
R(risk) = p(probability of occurrence) x 
C(consequence of occurrence either represented by 
some value or by a loss function) 
 
Risk management is the process of identifying 
risk, assessing risk and taking steps to manage risk by 
reducing risks to an acceptable level [23].  
Acceptable level of risk depends on the managers of 
a organization. For example, for organization A a 
loss of $30,000 might be huge risk while for an 
organization B this amount represents a minor risk. 
Additionally, Smith et al. [28] and Aubert et al. [2] 
argue that information systems managers and 
researchers traditionally define risk in terms of 
negative consequences describing risk as the 
possibility of loss or damage and the possibility of 
suffering harm or loss. 
An alternative view by Billington [3] points out 
that, when examined closely, “risk” can actually lead 
to both positive and/or negative consequences. In any 
particular initiative, he notes, the risks involved could 
represent different meaning to an organization. 
Billington [3] proposes three dimensions of a risk: 
 
1. A hazard that must be minimized or 
eliminated; 
2. An uncertainty about which path should be 
taken and which must be studied to reduce 
the variance between anticipated outcomes 
and actual results; and 
3. An opportunity for growth or improvement, 
which must be assessed to determine how 
much innovation, initiative and 
entrepreneurship should be exercised. 
 
Viewing risk as something more than a hazard is 
highly applicable to risk management in KM [19]. 
Although KM risks can lead to negative results, they 
can also represent significant opportunities for 
savings or business development. For example, 
losing a subject matter expert who has 30+ years of 
experience in a particular aspect of a business (due to 
retirement) might be perceived as a huge risk that can 
potentially cause a large financial loss. However, this 
same scenario might open doors to hiring new talent 
that costs less money (e.g., lower starting salary) that 
can bring new ways of addressing business problems.  
Uncertainty associated with knowledge use, be it 
due to rapidly changing technology and storage 
media, to misuse or new and unexpected uses of 
knowledge or to the basic understanding of the 
captured knowledge, is one of the biggest challenges 
a KM manager faces. This is the reason why this 
paper is focusing on the risk of knowledge loss from 
a human source, for example, loss of knowledge from 
particular expert or knowledge worker.  
A final note on the risk formula shown above is 
that it recognizes that determining exact probabilities 
and values for consequence is difficult. An 
alternative to probabilities and consequence values 
proposed by several sources is to utilize relative 
ranges or scores for the probability and consequence 
value. When this is done, probability becomes 
likelihood and consequence value becomes 
consequence.  This paper, as discussed later, uses this 
approach of utilizing scores and thus uses likelihood 
and consequence. This also allows a group of 
employees to agree on a likelihood and score rather 
than for one employee to come up with these values.   
While the scoring approach does not provide specific 
risk values it does provide a relative ranking of risks 
that provides risk management staff with a prioritized 
list of risks that allows for the most severe risks to be 
addressed first. 
Practical risk management bases risk assessment 
on the identification and assessment of threats to the 
organization’s assets.  NIST SP 800-30r1 [22] 
defines a threat as any event or circumstance that can 
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adversely affect organizational operations or 
knowledge assets. A threat source is an adversarial or 
non-adversarial source that could cause damage to a 
system by exploiting a vulnerability.  A vulnerability 
is defined as a security weakness in the program or 
an asset’s controls.  Threat sources can be internal or 
external to the organization.  In addition, threats can 
be intentional or accidental.  Finally, a threat source 
can be a natural or man-made disaster.  Threat 
assessment is about identifying threat sources and the 
vulnerabilities they can use to exploit/damage a 
knowledge asset.  The purpose of threat assessments 
is to identify specific threat sources and the 
vulnerabilities that would be used to attack the 
organization’s knowledge assets.  The Risk Formula 
and assessment uses the results of threat assessment 
by using the consequence/damage caused by a threat 
utilizing a vulnerability and the probability/likelihood 
of this occurring to determine risk values/ratings. 
To assist organizations in performing threat 
assessments generic threats are proposed.  One such 
set is from Whitman and Mattord [33] who propose 
12 threat categories: 
• Compromises to intellectual property 
• Deviations in quality of service 
• Forces of nature 
• Espionage or trespass 
• Human error or failure 
• Information extortion 
• Sabotage or vandalism 
• Software attacks 
• Technical hardware failures or errors 
• Technical software failures or errors 
• Technical obsolescence 
• Theft  
The purpose of this list of threats is to provide 
organizations a guide as to where to look for 
knowledge security threats.  It should be noted that 
this threat list includes technical threats, behavioral 
threats and legal threats.  It is our purpose to propose 
such a list for KM/knowledge systems.  Since 
KM/knowledge systems primarily focus on providing 
knowledge users with knowledge for making 
decisions our paper focuses on risks/threats 
associated with the capture, storage, retrieval, and use 
of knowledge.  Our list considers technical, 
behavioral, and legal threats, and are generated by 
analyzing how KM/knowledge systems can be 
misused or abused with the specifics of how this is 
done being presented in the next section. 
 
2.1. Risk Assessment Frameworks  
 
The purpose of any risk assessment framework is 
to establish rules for what is assessed, who are the 
main actors that need to be involved in this 
assessment, creates terminology for assessment, 
criteria for quantifying, qualifying, and comparing 
degrees of risk, and provides a way to document all 
of this [20]. The main purpose of a risk assessment 
framework is to establish an objective measurement 
of risk so that an organization can understand risk 
and take appropriate action to mitigate it and bring it 
to an acceptable level.  
Information technology professionals can choose 
from several risk assessment frameworks [20]: 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and 
Vulnerability Assessment) and NIST risk assessment 
framework, ISACA’s Risk IT (part of COBIT), and 
ISO 27005:2008 (part of the ISO 27000 series). 
While these frameworks differ some in their 
prescription on how to do risk assessment, they all 
have the following five parts in common [5]: 
• Development of risk measurement criteria 
• Asset inventory 
• Threat identification 
• Risk score calculation 
• Documentation of existing controls 
• Identification of improvements to controls 
Researchers and practitioners have been working 
on risk assessment frameworks for the area of 
KM/Knowledge Systems. These are discussed below. 
 
3.  KM/Knowledge Systems Risk 
Assessment Frameworks 
 
Three KM knowledge system risk assessments 
have been proposed.  Thalman et al. [29], Padyab et 
al. [26], and Ilvonen et al. [6] have all proposed 
KM/knowledge systems risk assessment frameworks 
that are differentiated by the KM/knowledge contexts 
upon which they focus.  Thalman et al. [29] focused 
on the knowledge sharing process context as the basis 
for assessing risk and then mapped the traditional 
information security framework into a KM security 
framework.  Padyab et al. [26] also focused on the 
knowledge sharing process context and then used 
communication genres and the OCTAVE Allegro 
risk framework to create a KM/knowledge system 
risk framework.  Ilvonen et al. [6] expanded the 
context of their KM risk framework to include the 
knowledge processes of knowledge creation, 
knowledge sharing, and management of knowledge; 
and then fused it with the NIST SP 800-37r2 risk 
management framework to create their knowledge 
security risk management framework (see Figure 1). 
Ilvonen et al [6, p.13] define knowledge security “as 
the managerial process of organizations to identify 
threats toward important knowledge and secure the 
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knowledge against those threats.” In the first stage, 
the business case of the intended KM initiative or 
change to the initiative, and a description of what 
kind of benefits are sought by the initiative/change 
are described by an organization. This is followed by 
knowledge identification that can be done in three 
ways: (1) examination of different locations, uses, 
topics and destinations of knowledge; (2) genre-
based approach where different actors and their way 
of communication with other actors are identified and 
(3) examination of the knowledge systems where the 
knowledge resides. Threat identification happens 
along the lines of external threats and accidental or 
deliberate internal threats to the knowledge assets. In 
the risk analysis step, the identified threats are 
individually analyzed to recognize what kind of risks 
they may cause and how significant these risks are. 
Cost/benefit analysis deals with the costs of 
implementing controls that mitigate these risks. Step 
six, risk controls that need to be implemented are 
identified along with a plan for implementing them. 
Finally, monitoring which is a crucial part of Ilvonen 
et al [6] framework provides the organization with 
situational awareness of the risk environment the 
organization is facing.  
We use the Knowledge Security Risk 
Management Framework as it uses a fuller context of 
how knowledge processes fit the overall 
KM/knowledge systems business processes and is 
thus a more complete KM/knowledge system risk 
management framework.  
Figure 1 Knowledge Security Risk Management 
Framework [6] 
 
3. 1. KM/Knowledge System Threat 
Assessment  
 
Figure 1 includes threat identification as a part of 
the risk management framework.  To create a generic 
set of threats for KM/knowledge systems we start 
with the basic KM/knowledge system processes of 
knowledge creation, sharing, and management and 
then add a further concern from Walsh and Ungson 
[31] who identified three contexts in which 
Organizational Memory (OM) could be misused: 
• Automatic retrieval of knowledge may lead 
to a routine decision response when a non-
routine decision response is warranted;  
• The controlled retrieval of knowledge may 
lead to a non-routine decision response 
when a routine decision response was 
appropriate;  
• A controlled retrieval of knowledge may be 
appropriately activated in an attempt to elicit 
a non-routine decision response, but it may 
be implemented poorly. 
Misuse of the OM occurs when organizational 
members self-servingly select knowledge to support 
positions that serve their political needs rather than 
the organization’s [31].  Also, misuse of OM is a 
unique threat to knowledge use.  These three misuse 
risks are also applicable to KM/Knowledge Systems 
as OM is a fundamental and integral part of 
KM/Knowledge Systems [16] and as such, OM 
threats are KM/Knowledge Systems threats. 
We find the main KM/Knowledge Systems 
specific threats to be based on a threat analysis of the 
Walsh and Ungson [31] OM risk context above as 
well as by integrating traditional security threats 
(such as those listed by Whitman and Mattord [33]) 
to KM/knowledge system processes (creation, 
storing, sharing, and management) to generate the 
below set of KM/knowledge system specific generic 
threats.  This list reflects the misuse, abuse, 
disclosure, and loss of knowledge within the 
KM/Knowledge system and are grouped by technical, 
behavioral, and legal threats.  Studies that illustrate or 
support the identified threats are also liste: 
1. Failure to identify and capture critical knowledge 
in the knowledge creation process.  This has 
been observed in several studies: Jennex and 
Zyngier [19] observed that large organizations 
that relied on humans to identify and capture 
critical knowledge often failed to sometimes 
identify and many more times capture critical 
knowledge. Jennex [10] [11] observed the failure 
to identify and capture critical knowledge in an 
engineering organization when identification of 
what to capture and to what detail to capture 
knowledge was left to organizational members 
with different levels of understanding the 
knowledge.  In some cases, very experienced 
members failed to see the importance of 
capturing sufficient detail to make the 
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knowledge useful to less experienced members; 
and having less experienced members mis-
identify critical knowledge because they did not 
know what was important. Finally, Jennex 
(2010, 2013) observed that many organizations 
failed to retain captured critical knowledge after 
a change in storage formats. Particularly 
observed was the loss of knowledge as 
organization migrated to newer versions or 
different word processing packages or to a newer 
storage media (example is moving from floppy 
disk drives to laser disks to USB drives). What 
was observed was that organizations failed to 
transfer all the knowledge from one format or 
package to the newer format or package resulting 
in a loss of knowledge that many times was 
found out later to be critical knowledge.  
• Technical threats are from using automated 
tools to identify and capture critical 
knowledge with the vulnerabilities typically 
being in the ontologies and taxonomies used 
to guide the automated tools not accurately 
reflecting the domains being analyzed.  
Additional threats are from technical 
obsolescence leading to the loss of 
knowledge as the organization migrates to 
newer technologies. 
• Behavioral threats are from personnel 
intentionally or accidently classifying 
critical knowledge and not recognizing 
critical knowledge, not capturing enough 
detail with the knowledge, or failing to 
capture it when it is recognized. 
2. Disclosing critical knowledge to unauthorized 
recipients in the knowledge sharing processes.  
Jennex [10] [11] observed engineers sharing 
knowledge based on their own opinions of what 
was appropriate to share rather than following 
organizational guidelines. Jennex and Zyngier, 
[19] observed members of organizations sharing 
critical knowledge with unauthorized individuals 
because the organization had failed to classify 
disclosure categories of knowledge.  Jennex [12] 
observed for crises and disasters the issue of 
what knowledge should be posted on social 
media and what knowledge should be trusted off 
of social media.  Walters [32] documents the use 
of USB drives to capture knowledge from users 
who plug the drives into their system. 
• Technical threats are from exploitation of 
communication vulnerabilities common to 
all communication systems and is focused 
on communication processes specific to 
KM/knowledge systems (as an example 
consider an organization using SharePoint as 
the system for communicating knowledge 
with the communication vulnerabilities 
being common to both knowledge and non-
knowledge applications).  Additional threats 
are from storage media by not properly 
securing access to cloud storage and/or 
server storage. 
• Behavioral threats are from intentionally or 
accidentally failing to maintain access 
control lists for authorizing approved 
personnel to access knowledge, posting 
knowledge to inappropriate forums, not 
following disclosure processes, not 
encrypting knowledge in motion, falling 
victim to social engineering attacks and 
either disclosing knowledge to unauthorized 
individuals or allowing malware onto their 
systems that are collecting and transmitting 
knowledge to unauthorized individuals. 
• Legal threats are from intentionally or 
accidentally not complying with disclosure 
laws such as those dealing with personally 
identifiable information or patient health 
knowledge.  Other threats are from the 
intentional theft of intellectual property and 
from the unintentional loss of intellectual 
property based on the cloud or collaborative 
medium on which it was stored or shared 
[27]. 
3. Losing critical knowledge by not capturing it 
from critical human sources. Jennex [15] and 
Jennex and Durcikova [17] observed this as an 
issue and proposed a process for rating 
knowledge sources and their likelihood of 
departing as well as providing a score to indicate 
the time criticality of taking action. 
• Behavioral threats are from intentionally or 
accidentally not identifying critical human 
knowledge repositories and taking actions to 
capture and store the critical knowledge (this 
threat is typically not capturing knowledge 
from retiring personnel but also can occur 
by not capturing knowledge from personnel 
departing an organization for reasons other 
than retirement). 
• Legal threats are from intentionally or 
accidentally not complying with required 
knowledge capture (an example of this was 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
requirements on nuclear stations to capture 
critical knowledge from employees prior to 
large scale work force layoffs). 
4. Losing critical knowledge by not storing it on 
nonvolatile media or by not migrating 
knowledge with changing storage standards. 
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Jennex, [12] [14] has reported large scale losses 
of critical knowledge due to storage media not 
surviving as long as expected.  Losses include 
NASA losing plans for moon craft, nuclear 
plants losing documents stored on older storages 
media such as 8, 5 ¼, and 3 ½ inch floppy disks, 
microfiche, paper, etc.  Additional knowledge 
losses were observed as organizations migrate to 
newer softwares or newer versions of software, 
and changing data storage formats. 
• Technical threats are from the failure of 
storage media, hardware, and/or software. 
• Behavioral threats are from intentionally or 
accidentally not following technology 
procurement processes, selecting providers 
without checking their technology, not 
planning for obsolescence, not testing 
technologies before applying them or while 
using them, and/or artificially obsoleting 
technologies before age requires it. 
5. Giving bad advice by not using appropriate 
knowledge. This risk is illustrated by high profile 
errors in decision making such as Jennex [13] 
report on the conviction of the scientific panel 
who told citizens there was little likelihood of a 
seismic event prior to the 2009 L’Aquila, Italy 
earthquake that killed 309.  Vaughn [30] and 
Boin and Fishbacher-Smith, D. [4] discuss the 
decision making process that ignored safety 
concerns from the contractors prior to the 1986 
Challenger space shuttle disaster. Perrow [25] 
discusses the human errors made that led to the 
severity of the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear 
disaster 
• Technical threats are from search tools not 
finding relevant knowledge, improperly 
prioritizing knowledge, not using integration 
tools allowing relevant knowledge to not be 
incorporated into search results, and/or using 
visualization technologies that influence 
decision makers to the wrong option. 
• Behavioral threats are from decision makers 
using incomplete knowledge, and/or 
inappropriately applying knowledge to 
unsuitable decision contexts. 
• Legal threats are from decision makers not 
utilizing due care or due diligence in 
assessing knowledge. 
 
4. Newly Proposed Risk Assessment 
Framework for Knowledge 
Management/Knowledge Systems 
 
Ilvonen, et al. [6] proposed a risk management 
framework for KM/knowledge systems as shown in 
Figure 1.  We propose an enhancement to this 
framework that offers a high-level KM risk 
assessment.  Jennex [15] proposed a risk 
management process for assessing knowledge loss 
risk with departing personnel.  This was a form based 
process that walked managers through the risk 
assessment process. Jennex and Durcikova [17] 
utilized this form based risk assessment process to 
assess the knowledge loss risk with graduate students 
and found the form based process to be a good 
process.  Based on this experience and further 
literature review provided on both general risk 
assessment frameworks and also on KM/Knowledge 
Systems framework, we are proposing the following 
template for knowledge risk assessment [5]. The 
definitions and possible values of each category are 
provided in Table 1.  
In general terms, an asset can be people, 
knowledge, processes, systems, or applications. We 
propose that the key asset for KM/knowledge 
systems is the knowledge from a particular expert or 
knowledge worker.  
When creating the risk assessment for 
KM/knowledge systems, one would identify all the 
different knowledge assets and then identify every 
threat to each knowledge asset, following the 
categories in Table 1. In general, the impact areas are 
one or several from the following: financial 
(expenses and revenues), productivity (business 
operations), reputation (perceptions of customers and 
society), legal (fines and litigations), and safety 
(safety or employees, customers, environment). It is 
important to note that these areas are not exhaustive, 
and that an organization may remove or add areas. 
The importance of each area must be ranked as 
low/medium/high while keeping in mind that not all 
areas are high impact. Next, the impact of each threat 
on the asset must be in each are must be evaluated. 
For example, business leaders must evaluate whether 
a loss of 1% or 5% of revenue is considered to have a 
low/medium/high impact. Scenarios must be written 
out so that anybody who reads them can follow the 
logic or the arguments. The next step is to calculate 
the risk score that is the product of the ranking and 
impact. This score is meaningless by itself, but very 
useful when we compare the impact of different 
threats on different assets.  
An organization can pick from one to four risk 
control strategies: accept (taking no action against the 
treat), mitigate, share, or defer. The only threats that 
should be accepted would have a very low risk score. 
Most of the threats will be mitigated (control(s) 
would be implemented) or shared (e.g., insurance 
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would be purchased). Examples of control could be 
codification of knowledge that would happen on a 
regular basis either by automatic agents or by 
apprentices who shadow a knowledge worker.  
In congruence with the traditional risk assessment 
frameworks, the highest risk score threats must be 
processed as first and appropriate controls must be 
initiated.  
 
5. Contribution to Research and Practice  
 
Creation, storage, and reuse of knowledge is a 
source of both short term and long term competitive 
advantage for organization [1]. Thus, organizations 
need to pay more attention to safeguard this 
important asset.  
Our contribution to research builds on existing 
generic risk assessment frameworks and knowledge 
management frameworks to create an easy way to 
calculate the risk score for each threat to an asset. 
Specifically, we contribute to research in the 
following ways: First, we provide an in-depth 
discussion of threats to knowledge assets (see section 
3.1). Nor the generic framework or the knowledge 
management security risk assessment provide such a 
guideline. Second, we provide a concrete approach 
on how to calculate the risk score by identifying 
possible impact areas, rank the importance of these 
impact areas, easily score the impact. While the risk 
score by itself is not that useful, it becomes very 
useful when compared to risk scores of other 
threat/asset pairs.  
Our contribution to practice is twofold: First, we 
provide a business-driven approach to identifying and 
categorizing (low/medium/high) the impact of a 
threat for five business area – financial, productivity, 
reputation, legal, and safety. The impact needs to be 
discussed with managers as they are the best 
informed what is a high/low impact. Second, our 
approach offers a use of a template that can be 
followed by both technical and non-technical staff 
and thus allows for a faster documentation of 
assets/threats, their potential impact, and risk 
mitigation techniques.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Risk Assessment for Knowledge Management 
 
Asset The object of the risk assessment - knowledge from particular 
expert or knowledge worker 
Asset Owner/Custodian Owners have the authority to accept risk. Custodian of the asset 
are responsible for implementing and maintaining controls that 
protect the asset.  
Asset Importance Low/Medium/High 
Threat Any way an asset could be compromised that would have an 
impact on a business. See examples in the Knowledge 
Management/Knowledge System Threat Assessment section of 
this paper.  
Threat Description ____ Failure to identify and capture critical knowledge in the 
knowledge creation process. 
____ Disclosing critical knowledge to unauthorized recipients 
in the knowledge sharing processes 
 _____ Losing critical knowledge by not capturing it from 
critical human sources. 
_____ Losing critical knowledge by not storing it on 
nonvolatile media or by not migrating knowledge with 
changing storage standards 
_____ Giving bad advice by not using appropriate knowledge.  
Likelihood Low (1)/ Medium (2)/ High (3) 
Impact on  ____ Confidentiality of knowledge 
_____Integrity of knowledge  
____ Availability of knowledge 
Page 4956
Impact Area Ranking Impact  Score 
Financial Low (1)/Medium (2)/High 
(3) 
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High (3)  
Productivity Low (1)/Medium (2)/High 
(3) 
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High (3)  
Reputation Low (1)/Medium (2)/High 
(3) 
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High (3)  
Legal Low (1)/Medium (2)/High 
(3) 
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High (3)  
Safety Low (1)/Medium (2)/High 
(3) 
Low (1)/Medium (2)/High (3)  
    Risk Score 
(Likelihood x Impact Score)  
Adequacy of Existing Controls Low/Medium/High 
Risk Control Strategy ___ Accept 
___ Mitigate 
___ Share 
____Defer 
Risk Mitigation Controls Description 
Control 1  
Control 2  
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper builds on previous generic risk 
assessment framework and the Knowledge Security 
Risk Assessment Framework [6] to create the risk 
assessment for knowledge management. This 
addition to the framework contributes to the current 
research and practice, by providing a KM/knowledge 
system specific threat analysis and a template that 
can be followed to not only capture the knowledge 
asset, but also to capture the potential threat, it’s 
likelihood, impact, risk score in an easy to understand 
fashion that streamlines the whole process. Previous 
research that discussed risk in KM did not provide 
such a step-by-step approach that is repeatable in any 
organizations.  
Future research will apply the framework in case 
studies, preferably in organizations that have 
previously performed risk assessments so that the 
results from that risk assessment and the risk 
assessment performed using our proposed threat 
analysis and risk form can be compared.  
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